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Introduction
Academic Diplomacy, a term coined by Peter Wallensteen, means 
activity where international experts, rather than other states, try 
to broker peace as moderators, mediators or facilitators, by using 
means and methods that are advised by the theory of conflict 
resolution [1]. Such an approach has been associated with positivist 
approaches of peace research and it has aimed at creating exogenous 
conditions that science has proven as useful for peace, and removing 
exogenous conditions that analysis has associated with the onset or 
continuation of violence. Peace diplomacy by scholars is therefore 
based on knowledge rather than power, but it uses only knowledge 
that is practical; knowledge that puts the academic diplomat on top of 
things in conflict resolution. Thus the value of knowledge in academic 
diplomacy is being judged by pragmatist criteria.
This paper aims at reviewing some approaches of peace research 
by looking at their practical value in academic diplomacy. Instead of 
comparing scientific premises of different approaches to some criteria 
of good science that these approaches themselves have arrived at, I 
will look at how different scholarly understandings work in practical 
academic diplomacy for the prevention of conflicts and violence. Since 
academic diplomacy is normally associated with very positivistic 
“social engineering” of peace, I will in this paper look at how post-
positivist approaches could be useful for academic diplomacy and how 
post-positivist approaches could reveal problems of traditional peace 
research approaches in the social engineering of peace. My main focus 
is in a selection of empiricist premises that dominate mainstream peace 
research (and classical pragmatism), whose limitations I criticize by 
showing how a selection of post-positivist approaches manage to do 
more for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Thus the aim of 
the paper is not just to criticize some approaches of peace research by 
using pragmatist criteria, but also to criticize some of the empiricist 
assumptions in the classical version of pragmatism. For the sake of 
conceptual clarity I will therefore name the criteria I am using for the 
critique of positivist peace research “neo-pragmatism”.
The main focus of my pragmatist critique is policy-oriented, 
positivistic mainstream peace research. Policy-oriented social science 
normally operates on the basis of very classical pragmatist, empiricist 
premises. Whatever has been learned in the philosophy of social 
science after Peirce, James and Dewey has not been considered useful 
in pragmatic peace research. Policy-oriented peace research that aims 
at building a linkage between peace research and peace practice often 
assumes a Humean concept of causality. From that premise it then 
tries to find exogenous, objective, material and measurable conditions 
that cause peace. Once such conditions have been identified, 
practitioners will then contribute to peace by creating conditions that 
cause peace and by removing conditions that cause war. The simplicity 
of such social engineering is challenged in by this paper, which 
basically concludes that ontologies that take the social construction of 
social structures of peace and war seriously are not just intellectually 
intriguing, but also pragmatic for peace practitioners.
 This paper is essentially a product of experience of academic 
diplomacy and capacity-building in conflict management in West
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Kalimantan. This activity aimed at contributing to peace but it also 
contributed to the “diagnosis of the conflict” in West Kalimantan. 
At the same time, the knowledge of the path to conflict of the peace 
practitioners in West Kalimantan was constantly tested by practice; 
whenever blocking some paths to conflicts failed to reduce violence, 
the diagnosis had to be revised.
What the practice taught to research was not what was expected, i.e. 
generalizations on exogenous conditions of peace. Instead, it taught 
about the opportunities to denaturalize and criticize social constructs 
that were necessary for the legitimation of violence, opportunities to 
challenge and deconstruct them and to offer alternative constructs 
that constituted less violent realities. In short practice of academic 
diplomacy in West Kalimantan taught about the pragmatism of 
critical and constructivist peace research.
Academic Diplomacy as Social Engineering of Peace
Classical pragmatism and traditional peace research and academic 
diplomacy are all committed to empiricism, which does not distinguish 
between natural and social sciences.Instead empiricism derives 
the methods and ontologies of social science from natural science. 
For Dewey, "Knowing is a way of employing empirical occurrences 
with respect to increasing power to direct the consequences which 
flow from things, the application of the conclusions must be made 
to philosophy itself."[4] This is whyacademic diplomacy advised 
by classical pragmatist peace research is like social engineering of 
peace. When there is a problem with a physical machine, scientists 
of technology are needed to investigate the causes of the problem 
and create prescriptions on how to remove these causal conditions. 
Similarly classical pragmatist peace research engineers problems 
of conflict and peacemakers follow the prescriptions of peace 
researchers. Thus, according to Dewey, social engineering is the 
function of pragmatist social sciences [3].
The way in which social engineering has traditionally studied 
occurrences to increase the power of the ones, who know about these 
occurrences, is related to causality. If we know what conditions or 
events cause conflict, we can engineer peace by systematically avoiding
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those conditions and events. Despite the problems later discovered in 
this kind of thinking, peace research that has followed the maxims of 
social engineering have managed to create a lot of knowledge useful 
for peace-makers.
Any discussion with practical peace-makers, academic diplomats, 
about the use of social sciences reveal that most mediators and 
facilitators of peace processes think about knowledge on peace and 
war within an intellectual framing of social engineering. They think of 
conditions that could help create peace and conditions and situations 
that could be prevented in order to prevent war or escalation of 
violence. This is why it is useful to take the use of peace research as 
social engineering very seriously. Social engineering of peace can save, 
and, indeed, has saved many lives, and thus regardless of problems 
related to it, it can be used in a valuable manner. 
Furthermore, social engineering frame of peace research needs to 
be taken seriously also because of the problems involved in it. If most 
academic diplomats of peace and security think of knowledge in their 
practice of social engineering of peace, pragmatist peace research 
must also take this framing seriously as something that needs to be 
criticized and developed further, as the flaws of the social engineering 
frame also kill people in wars.
 
Social engineering of peace in the main peace research journals 
(Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution and 
International Security) tends to recognize the complexity of causal 
relations in peace and conflict situations. Instead of looking at single 
deterministic independent variables that could explain peace and war 
in their entirety, most scholars follow long and complex causal chains 
and acknowledge the probabilistic (yet probabilistically deterministic) 
nature of causality. Instead of claiming that poverty causes war, 
scholars of relative deprivation, for example, claim that economic 
decline and ethnic diversity together with ethnic functionalization of 
the economy cause relative deprivation which, again, increases the risk 
(causes in a probabilistic sense) of conflict [5,6]. 
The frame of social engineering of peace by using causal models has 
resulted in several useful theories. While causal modeling simulates 
causal mechanisms in natural sciences, in the social engineering of 
peace, they have often sought explanations for causal relationship 
from a frame that seems to assume purposive action and certain 
voluntarism. War causes have been explained by conditions that
1. Make existing peace frustrating or intolerable (see for example, 
theories of relative deprivation; [5,6], 
2. Make violence attractive (see for example, theories of gainful 
violence, [7,8]
3. Create opportunities for gainful violence (see for example 
theories of resource mobilization, [9] or 
4. Block alternative ways of political influence and thereby force 
people to violence [10].
Theories do not tend to explain the contradiction between 
voluntarism and causation, as the former suggests that people 
can decide what they want while the other suggests that at least 
in a probabilistic manner human action is determined by some 
conditions. Wendt suggests that these theories assume an objective 
set of preferences with a given logic of rationality that determine 
human action. If then conditions are changed in a way that increase 
the utility of violence, the likelihood of violence increases. In such a 
framing human’s might be purposive but not free, as their purpose is 
to maximize utility in a set of preferences that are given to them [11].
The Problem of Determinism in Social Engineering of Peace: 
Morality and Norms 
One of the main problems with peace research that imitates the 
criteria of science of natural science, by using the laws that research 
defines for phenomena for the engineering of societies is the problem 
of determinism. Even if peace research only produces conclusions on 
probabilistic causality such models too are deterministic. They claim 
to explain only the variation it has managed to cover by deterministic 
rules. The unexplained part of conflict reality could be ruled by free 
will, but that is not included in the covering rule-models. Furthermore, 
in line with models of natural science empiricist peace research 
thrives to models that explain maximum share of variation and thus 
its optimum could be seen as a model that is fully deterministic. 
The problem with such deterministic models is that they leave out 
human purposiveness, the question of the “will”, and the related issues 
of norms, morality, multiplicity of potentials for the development of 
the society existent in each social situation etc.. This problem boils 
down to the simple fact that while water does not consider boiling 
in 100 degrees Celsius, human behavior is fundamentally different, 
as people do consider their actions. Water cannot be held morally 
accountable for its boiling, while a human being is always morally 
accountable for her/his actions, simply because she/he has had the 
opportunity to decide whether or not to do what she/he does, while 
water has no choice. Responsibility for actions that we take out of 
a degree of free will has been the foundation of our understanding 
of morality. At least Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, James Bentham, 
Rousseau, Mills, John Locke, and Hayek have made this very explicit 
in their analysis of ethics.  In addition to theories of ethics also our 
common sense thinking links morality with free will. Studies show 
that a majority of people associate these two and would not understand 
morality without at least some sense of freedom of the will. Thus if we 
do not incorporate some degree of freedom to our study of peace and 
war, we cannot incorporate norms and morality in our analysis either.
In West Kalimantan determinist truth regimes were used to wiggle 
out from moral accountability. In some cases moral accountability was 
removed by using popular version of some of the classical positivist 
peace research explanations of conflict, such as relative deprivation. 
If relative deprivation is a condition that causes violence like 
temperature causes water to boil, perpetrators of violence would have 
no more moral accountability for their violence than water has for 
its boiling. A youth leader in TanjungKeracut village explained how 
the arrogant behavior of youth of the migrant Madurese community 
waslike the pressure on a spring (representing Malay patience). 
It could be pressedto a certain extent, but after that the spring was 
bound to bounce back [12]. According to the village head of the same 
village, Malay mobs burned thehouses of the Madurese only to chase 
them away in order to stop killings by theMadurese. According to 
both, the escalation from burning houses to mass killings was outside 
anyone’s control: “It was much like an accident.”[13].
Similarly, the discourse of indigenous rights created a rationale 
for another indigenous community, the Dayaks, to wiggle out from 
the moral condemnation of their violence against the Madurese 
community. According to several activists of indigenous rights, the
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marginalization of the indigenous Dayak community, the threat of 
modernity to their way of life and the role of the Madurese migrants 
who were ignorant and insensitive about these grievances created 
a situation of deprivation that somehow automatically caused 
violence [14]. When discussing about incidents of violence against 
the Madurese migrants many Dayaks and Malays, including several 
Malay and Dayak scholars insisted on focusing on the “root causes” 
of violence, namely the conditions that Madurese appearance to West 
Kalimantan created to the local communities. This way deterministic 
modeling and copying the types of scientific ways of building 
explanations in the study of social structures of conflict not only miss 
the opportunities norms and moral accountability could offer for 
peace-making, it also offers truth regimes that help perpetrators of 
violence escape moral accountability.
The Problem of Determinism in Academic Diplomacy: 
Association of Violence to the Characteristics of The Enemy
When determinism affects one’s own identity it takes away morality, 
but when deterministic “knowledge” affects one’s perception of the 
enemy it removes resolution of conflicts from our menu of options. 
If a conflicting party has a deterministic view of his/her enemy, it is 
the characteristics of the enemy that cause their violent preferences 
(instinctivism) or it is the conditions to which the given preferences of 
the enemy mechanistically reacts to (environmentism), not their will 
that could be reconciled with the will of conflicting party’s own side. If 
preferences are determined there is no room for a voluntary alteration 
of one’s will and preferences and thus negotiation cannot achieve 
much. Logically this leads to a conclusion that violence springs from 
the enemy and thusthe enemy has to be stopped (enemy’s ability to act 
in accordance to its preferences have to be taken away) or liquidated 
as a measure to prevent violence: villages have to be destroyed and 
people in them have to be killed in order to secure them as a US 
Major said in a news briefing in defense of a military operation in a 
Vietnamese village.
In West Kalimantan ethnicity was assumed to carry objective 
characteristics. Malays were lazy, Dayaks stupid and the Madurese 
violent. As in many conflicts between “migrants” and “locals”, in 
West Kalimantan, the conflict activities of the migrant population 
were treated as being caused by the vicious character of the that 
population. The Madurese had violent preferences due to their genetic 
make-up [14, 15]. Later the explanation changed and the same people 
interviewed earlier explained that it was just the Madurese culture that 
was incompatible with the local Dayak and Malay cultures: According 
to the head of the Sambas regency, Ir. H. Burhanuddin A. Rasyid “The 
cultural patterns of the Madurese are not compatible with those of 
the local population. They tend to have difficulty in assimilating to 
the local tradition. This is what is at the root of the conflict here.” 
[16].According to a Dayak community leader, BonggasBernandinus, 
the Madurese were unable to assimilate and this created a friction 
that inevitably lead to conflict [17]. The conclusion of was the same 
regardless of whether the regime of truth emphasized determinism 
of race or a culture: the Madurese had to be expelled from the district 
and those who refused to leave had to be killed.
While the treatment of conflicts as inconsistencies of purposes 
allows conflict scholars to focus on how best these purposes could 
be reconciled, explanations that emulateexplanations in physics or 
chemistry – explanations that do not see the fundamental difference 
between free purposive actors and determined entities – do not only 
          
fail to identify opportunities for peace-making, but they also 
contribute to truth regimes that entail legitimacy for violence. While 
deterministic peace research is obviously more nuanced and does not 
ignore purposes, its founding philosophy and the scientific ethos is 
incompatible with modeling that starts from the concept of conflicting 
free wills.
Finally, perceiving one’s opponent’s belief of oneself as determined 
by material realities gives one an opportunity to exploit this naive 
belief in one’s inability for moral action. If we believe in a materially 
determined mechanism of relative deprivation our opponent can 
create the conditions of such deprivation to squeeze concessions 
from us. The construction of indigenous rights created a perception 
of relative deprivation and by acting as if that condition had forced 
people to violence, some Dayak activists managed to gain concessions 
from other communities. In Sanggau, a group of Dayaks decided that it 
was unacceptable for a regency with a Dayak majority to have a regent 
from any other community, and so to prevent this from happening a 
spontaneous reaction to prevent other communities from voting by 
physically preventing their access to the ballot boxes happened just 
like an accidence [18].
  While it is natural that positivistic peace research does not create 
these deterministic misunderstandings, and that theories like the 
one on relative deprivation, were abused in West Kalimantan rather 
than used in a scientifically acceptable manner. However, it is still 
the rejection of the free purposiveness of humans that contributes 
to all these destructive truth regimes, and this rejection is typical for 
thinking that treats social science as natural science. If we recognize 
the possibility of alternative futures in each social setting – the fact 
that purposive actors are able to move to several directions from one 
basic setting – this does not only mean a different way of modeling 
conflicts. It also means that evidence of the actualized futures does 
not prove the impossibility of the not actualized futures [19]. This 
shakes the fundaments of empiricist peace research and challenges 
the empiricist premises of the classical version of pragmatism.
The Problem of Exogenous Causal Conditions
Mainstream peace research finds its relevance for peace practitioners 
in its ability to identify the objective exogenous conditions that 
cause war and peace. The remaining task for peace practitioners is 
then simply to remove the conditions peace researchers have found 
causally associated with conflicts, conflict escalation or difficulties in 
conflict termination. There is no doubt that causal models that peace 
research has produced have actually been very useful in practical 
conflict prevention. Causality exists side by side with purposive action 
and interacts with it.
It is also understandable that causal analysis tries to avoid treating 
“illusions of causality” between conceptually/analytically linked 
phenomena as real. Being bachelor does not genuinely cause people 
not being married, as the two are analytically linked rather than one 
causing the other. It is thus understandable that peace science makes 
the distinction between analytical and synchronic associations and 
sets strict criteria for causal analysis against analytically associated 
dependent and independent variables. Yet this practice has thrown 
out some of the crucial tools from the toolbox of peace practitioners. 
What if social structures that exist only in our consciousness have 
elements that constitute each other, and thus have causal powers  by 
being analytically linked?
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In West Kalimantan it was clear that there was a dialectical, mutually 
constituting relationship between aggressive policies and identities of 
fighters or masculine men. People did fight because they felt it was 
in their identity, and yet, their identity was that of a fighter simply 
because they did fight. Fighting is what defines a fighter, and fighting 
is what a fighter does. Even if they could stop fighting and thus cease 
being fighters, or they could stop identifying themselves as fighters 
and then stop fighting, it was clear that this analytical association 
between identity and action was something that needed to be tackled 
as a dialectical relationship that in reality affected people involved in 
the war. 
In West Kalimantan the concept of masculinity was defined in a 
way that included some violent characterizations. In some Dayak 
subtribes oral tradition claims that men had to have committed a 
killing of another man before they could ask the father of the woman 
they loved for the permission of marriage [14]. This construct of 
masculinity necessarily had causal effects on conflict behavior. The 
fact that language that structured thinking of Dayak men was born 
before each of the individuals were born, meant that the existing 
violent concept of masculinity was taken as something natural, and 
not as a social construct that people could also transform [20,21]. 
Masculine identity naturalized their aggressive behavior simply 
because if masculinity was violence and they were men, then they 
were also violent, and since they were violent, they also made violent 
acts. 
The fact that Humean causal tradition dominates in peace research 
obscures the opportunities peace makers have in inventing non-
violent ways of expressing an identity or ways of denaturalizing and 
deconstructing/transforming identities that are harmful for peace. In 
West Kalimantan it would probably be possible to study the correlative 
relationship between the number of conflict fatalities in villages and 
whether or not these villages had a volleyball field in the middle of the 
village. It seemed clear that villages that had a volleyball field had been 
much less violence. Yet it would be absurd of claim that volleyball 
and killing have any exogenous causal relationships. Yet a volleyball 
field materially facilitated an alternative expression of masculinity, 
which then reduced the need to express one’s masculinity in a violent 
manner [21-23]. In a culture where masculinity is defined through 
violence, symbolic battle on a volleyball field offers ways of enacting 
masculinity in a peaceful manner. Yet since causal powers affect 
peacefulness through mutual constitution of identity and action, such 
measures of pacification are rarely used by peace practitioners that are 
advised by mainstream peace research. 
Even less have traditionalist peace-makers explored opportunities 
of transformation of violent social constructs. In modern societies 
men no longer need to protect their families with violence, but in a 
modern capitalist society education protects families much more 
effectively that violence.This material reality makes the identitive 
association between masculinity and violence irrational. Thus violent 
masculinities could be possible to link to their ancient material 
foundation and thereby criticize their ancient character. Referring 
to current material realities it would also be possible to help the 
construction of peaceful, capitalist masculinities [24,25]. 
The condition of exogenousness in mainstream causal peace 
research thus prevents peace practitioners from focusing on identities 
that facilitate violent action. To some extent it also prevents attention 
to norms and the “realm of appropriateness”[11]. It would not be in
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accordance with the Hume criteria of causality to claim that a certain 
norm prevents violent action. The existence of a norm requires certain 
type of behavior-without any respect for the normative principle 
in practical action it would be difficult to claim the existence of a 
norm in a given society.Thus associating norms causally with non-
violent behavior would not be possible as norms and actions tend to 
be analytically/conceptually partly associated [26]. The valuation of 
development, for example, in some parts of West Kalimantan, and the 
norm prescribing people to focus on activities that promote economic 
development already conceptually rule out destructive actions, 
such as violent conflict behavior. Yet it could be that the best way of 
promoting long term peace in West Kalimantan would be to support 
the emergence and spread of the “norm of developmentalism” in the 
province.
The Problem of Meanings and Social Constructs in Academic 
Diplomacy
The problem of limiting research to exogenous relationship between 
independent and dependent variables already points to the direction 
of realities that exist only in meanings and the consciousness of people 
and are reproduced in language and meaningful social practices. Such 
realities cannot be studied by using scientific methods of natural 
sciences. Water does not attach meanings to its boiling while what 
is crucial to understand in human activity are the meanings people 
attach to their action. If a violent act is revenge, a murder, an act of 
aggression or law enforcement makes a great deal of difference even 
though they are empirically observed the very same act of violence.  
According to Blumer, and his symbolic interactionism, we can 
understand peoples’ actions only if we understand the meanings they 
give to their actions and if we understand what the actors themselves 
believe about their world [27]. The aim of social science, for symbolic 
interactionists, is therefore to reconstruct the reality actors that 
social scientists study perceive. The worst mistake a social scientist 
can do, according to Blumer, is to replace the meaning of the actor 
with the meaning the situation and the acts have for the scholar. If we 
think of traditional peace research let alone security studies, we can 
easily realize that scholarly meanings of key elements of peace and 
war, the concept of security, concepts of offense and defense, etc. are 
unproblematically assumed as given and not something conflicting 
parties could define themselves. Such view fails to understand the 
reasons of conflict behavior from the point of view of the one that 
conducts such behavior. In order to achieve this understanding 
specialistsof conflict problems should not assume a given conflict 
setting, but instead, they need to analyze the constructions of the 
conflict, by the conflicting parties and meanings that exist in language 
and existing social practices. 
The acquisition of citizenship by children of immigrants born in 
the territory
But what is important, too, is not just how the conflict setting 
is constructed, but also how it could be deconstructed and 
reconstructed. The key is not just the symbol, but also the symboling, 
the manipulation of symbols by active persons, defining and 
redefining their social situations [28]. This is one of the basic ideas of 
critical discourse analysis – critical discourse analysis is not only the 
analysis of existing interpretations, but also analysis of the production 
of reality which is performed by discourse [29].
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Empiricist analysis of violent acts can observe a phase in which several 
young men from the migrant Madurese community committed violent 
crimes especially in connection with economic activities and in the 
defense of their right to see girls from the two local communities.
In the next phase an empiricist could see a counter-reaction first in 
Bengkayang in 1996-7 by a large segment of the Dayak community 
and then in Sambas by an even broader segment of Malay men. A 
strict scientist cannot even observe this as the existence of a Dayak 
or Malay communities, the interpretation of an action as “counter-
reaction”, as well as the conventions that constitute the regions are all 
meanings and constructs that exist beyond direct observation. This 
counter-reaction consisted of demands and eventually terror to push 
Madurese people out of the two districts, and as this did not manage, 
a full-scale cannibalistic riot that killed thousands of Madurese 
men, women and children and effectively threw out the Madurese 
community from the areas where districts of Bengkayang and Sambas 
currently exist.
What could not be explained by simply observing the events was 
the way in which ordinary Madurese families with clear dispositions 
against violence and crime could sympathize with the Madurese 
criminal violence. Often even after murders ordinary Madurese 
families were willing to hide the perpetrators [30]. However, all 
this becomes much more understandable if one realizes how law 
and legality was interpreted in districts of Bengkayang and Sambas 
as extensions of local customary practices of the Malay and Dayak 
communities. “Criminal offenses” and the insistence of the right to 
date Dayak girls were ways to articulate an argument of common, 
equal Indonesianness of the communities in West Kalimantan, and 
to do away the reality of customary order in Bengkayang and Sambas. 
Only this way it becomes possible to understand the ethnic loyalty 
between criminal and law obedient Madurese individuals. “Criminals” 
in this context of meanings were defending equality of those people 
who provided “criminals” places to hide.
Furthermore the violent demand by the “local” communities to 
the Madurese either to assimilate or to leave articulated an argument 
in favor of the local customs and constructed the agency of “locals” 
and “visitors”, which then violence enforced upon the Madurese too 
(who no longer could live as if it did not exist). Violence was not 
a reaction to exogenous conditions, but an argument and a way of 
constructing social realities of agency in the region. This becomes 
clear in the reaction of the Madurese who before the conflicts felt they 
belonged to the place, but who after the conflict realized how strange 
the place was to them [31]. Even for some members of the indigenous 
communities the conflict “revealed” that the Madurese were guests. 
According to a Malay village leader in Sambas, “the Madurese were 
considered almost like local before the conflict (but no longer during 
and after it)” [13].
It is not possible or necessary for the argument in this paper to 
prove the accuracy of the reconstruction of the meanings that the 
conflicting parties gave to their actions and the contexts surrounding 
them. Yet, it is clear that these meanings could have been attached 
to the situation and if so, understanding them would have been 
crucial for the understanding or preventing the conflict. Alleviating 
grievances or addressing material disagreements would not have 
settled the conflict unless one addressed the social situation that 
was created by the meanings given by the conflicting parties to their 
actions and to the conflict. Realities were not there to be observed, 
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but they only existed in the minds of the conflicting parties, and they 
were not real without them being considered real. Thus focusing on 
material, objective realities only, leaves part of the crucially important 
conflict realities outside the focus.
The need to focus on socially constructed realities does not give 
a researcher the opportunity to reinterpret meanings as they please: 
social realities are socially, not individually constructed. Yet, the 
relationship between knowledge in social situations like peace and war 
is different than it is in natural sciences. A common knowledge about 
Dayaknesness does create Dayaknesness, while knowledge about the 
fact that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius has nothing to do with the 
process of boiling. This means for pragmatism that knowledge is no 
longer just an adaptation strategy to the external reality (as it used 
to be for classical pragmatists). Instead, knowledge is also a strategy 
of creating the external reality (constructivist pragmatism). Whether 
Dayaks are a political agent (or left-handed people, for that matter) 
should be judged against practical, ethical and political considerations. 
The question for research is still what should we consider as real and 
live as if it was real [32], but in the analysis of social structures we 
should remember that this is because knowledge makes them real. 
With regards to peace research this means that without sensitivity 
towards socially constructed social structures scientific peace research 
risks throwing out many tools from its toolbox of peace making.
 
In West Kalimantan the fact that violence was used as a way of 
articulating equal rights, or special rights of “local” communities leads 
peace practitioners to the search of alternative ways of articulating 
arguments about rights. In Indonesia addressing conflicting issues is 
rare and negatively sanctioned by the culture. Yet, arguing verbally 
something that has before been articulated only with demonstrative 
action is more efficient. Words are often more accurate expressions 
of meanings than actions. In West Kalimantan ethnic leaders found 
the West Kalimantan Ethnic Communication Forum, which was 
born out of a university class on conflict resolution targeted for these 
conflicting ethnic leaders, an efficient alternative to the articulation 
of their factual and normative construction of their conflict situation. 
The fact that both university education and the facilitation of the 
forum by the vice president of Indonesia boosted their prestige, made 
them eager to endorse the forum and participate in it constructively. 
The fact that ethnic agency in West Kalimantan was hierarchically 
constructed and that the ethnic leaders were undisputed in their 
leadership contributed to the discipline of ethnic action.
When ethnic leaders issued a statement banning ethnic mobilization 
in local and national parliamentary elections (Decision of the West 
Kalimantan Ethnic Communication Forum in June 2009),this 
made it risky and potentially treacherous for politicians to mobilize 
ethnic mobs in their support.Thus, elections after 2009 Pontianak 
Declaration on elections by the ethnic leaders became less violent and 
less marred with violent ethnic mobilization. The speech act of this 
declaration deconstructed ethnic agency in political campaigns and 
thus changed the reality of political competitions without in any way 
changing any exogenous, material, measurable conditions that could 
be considered causes of conflict. 
With widely publicized declarations ethnic leaders also 
deconstructed ethnic agency in inter-ethnic homicides-an event 
category that previously had sparked most ethnic riots. Whenever 
there was a murder or a rape by a person from another ethnic 
community, community leaders from the perpetrators and the 
victims community jointly declared in the local radio and in the local
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radio and in the local newspaper their condemnation of the 
individual action. The leader of the perpetrator’s community forbade 
any assistance in the hiding of the perpetrator individual by members 
of his community, while the victim’s community leader declared his 
acceptance of the fact that the murder was a criminal rather than 
an ethnic event between individuals rather than representatives of 
their communities. Referring to this he banned any community 
revenge and together with the perpetrator’s community they 
appealed to their communities for working with the police in order 
to catch the perpetrator. The police participated in the meeting of 
the communication forum that issues this protocol for inter-ethnic 
violent criminal events and issued a liaison official in the police for 
cooperation with the community leaders in these cases. Without 
changing any of the exogenous conditions community leaders 
managed to create a procedure that could frame the reality in cases 
of inter-ethnic violent crimes [24]. Several of such incidents and 
declarations took place at least in Bengkayang, and there speech acts 
by community leaders indeed did make these incidents individual 
rather than ethnic [33].
Several other well-publicized declarations of the West Kalimantan 
Ethnic Communication Forum that were planned in the course of 
peace research training of the community leaders acted as speech acts 
creating realities that had obvious causal powers in the behavior of 
members of the ethnic communities. Despite of not being measures 
to counter exogenous causes of conflict they nevertheless constituted 
realities that were positive for peace [34-36]. Declarations did not 
cause peaceful realities as consequences but instead, peaceful social 
realities were constituted in speech. Thus the mechanism of change 
was unimaginable for the traditional policy-oriented, pragmatist peace 
research, and therefore such peace research would not have managed 
to design such a strategy for peace. Understanding of the conflict 
situation had to be liberated first from the constraints of empiricist 
determinism [37,38]. Then the critical idea of denaturalization was 
needed for the opening of the opportunities of reframing.Symbolic 
interactionism was needed for the understanding of the meanings 
actors in conflict gave to their actions and the context of their action.
Constructivism was needed for the designing of the possible alternative 
non-violent social structures and post-structuralist theory of speech 
acts was needed to design speech acts that constituted the necessary 
non-violent alternative futures. Post-positivist theories that are often 
considered intellectually intriguing, but hopelessly philosophical and 
impractical were clearly needed for pragmatic understandings that 
enabled successful peace action in West Kalimantan.
Conclusion
This paper has intended to deliver an argument in favor ofsome 
post-positivist approaches in peace research and academic diplomacy 
for peace. Instead of making these arguments by referring to criteria 
of scholarship that scholarship itself set for itself, the intention here 
is to escape the tautologies of the philosophy of social sciences by 
referring to the praxis in support of theoretical arguments. Instead 
of demanding that scholarship has to be scientific in order to be good 
science, this paper has insisted that peace research has to contribute to 
peace by being useful for peace diplomacy in order for it to be good. 
The criterion for quality of scholarship is then in “life” rather than in 
the definition of the scholarship itself. 
This paper is based on a fuller analysis of a peace process in 
West Kalimantan, from which elements have been selected for 
the demonstration of the practical usefulness of approaches that 
mainstream peace research has often considered intellectually 
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intriguing, but hopelessly philosophical, at times poetic and always 
impractical.
While the cases used for the demonstration of usefulness of post-
positivist approaches have been empirically accurate, they have 
undoubtedly been selective. This has exaggerated the causal powers 
of the constructs and speech acts arrived at with the use of several 
post-positivist approaches. I do not try to hide this. Selection has 
been made for the sake of not getting too deep into the factual details 
of the case of West Kalimantan, which for the scholars of conflict 
are not equally interested in. Yet, one needs to keep in mind that 
the intention of this paper has not been to demonstrate how useful 
post-positivist approaches have been in the peace process of West 
Kalimantan. Instead, the cases have been used to show that post-
positivist understandings can, in general, be pragmatic in a way that 
goes beyond the usefulness of post-positivist approaches.
Furthermore, one needs to keep in mind that my effort has not been 
to claim that positivist perspectives could not be useful for conflict 
resolution. Undoubtedly, especially when we approach the basic 
elements of survival, constructs of meanings of necessities of life tend 
to be so uniform in cultures that prefer life over death (i.e. all cultures) 
that one does not always need to consider the social meaning-giving 
to matters of life and death. Whatever meanings communities give 
for eating, or avoiding deadly force, it is often practical simply to 
assume that deprivation of safety or nutrition makes people do 
desperate, even violent things. Treating threats to nutrition or safety 
as exogenous factors to violent actions in contexts where violence 
can remove such threats could very well be useful. Thus, despite the 
fact that this paper has several times attacked the theory of relative 
deprivation, for example, I do not challenge that theory’s usefulness 
in many conflict contexts.
Finally, even if the post-positivist approaches that I have argued for, 
take their departure from the critique of empiricism of mainstream 
peace research, one should not conclude that this paper has attempted 
to attack everything that empiricism entails. Too often the poetic, 
impractical nature of post-positivist scholarship has been due to 
the total disregard of systematic empirical evidence, and reliance on 
random individual incidents or isolated reflections. Academic poetry 
does not offer muh for academic diplomacy and thus also critical 
approaches need to be empirically accurate in order to be useful for 
academic diplomacy for peace. Even if I argue that one should not 
think that elements relevant for the understanding of social structures 
of conflict and peace can all be operationalized into observable, let 
alone measurable factors, it is often possible to find proxies that 
reveal the directly unobservable elements in conflict realities. The 
construct of ethnic categories in politics in West Kalimantan, for 
example, cannot be observed directly. Yet, unless one can find proxies 
of such constructs in the way peoples speak about politics, one should 
not claim the existence of ethnicity in West Kalimantan politics. 
Furthermore, before claiming that such constructs are meaningful, let 
alone dominant in local politics, one needs to be able to measure the 
existence of traces of such constructs in a sample of political texts/
speeches and compare the number or extent of such traces against 
traces that can be used as proxies alternative constructs. Thus despite 
problems in the philosophy behind empiricism one can accept many 
of the methodological and scholarly criteria of empirical peace 
research.
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